EARLY FORMS OF LIABILITY.
The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common Law.To accomplish the task, other tools are needed besides logic.It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all.The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.
We must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation.But the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products at every stage.The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past.
In Massachusetts today, while, on the one hand, there are a great many rules which are quite sufficiently accounted for by their manifest good sense, on the other, there are some which can only be understood by reference to the infancy of procedure among the German tribes, or to the social condition of Rome under the Decemvirs.
I shall use the history of our law so far as it is necessary to explain a conception or to interpret a rule, but no further.In doing so there are two errors equally to be avoided both by writer and reader.One is that of supposing, because an idea seems very familiar and natural to us, that it has always been so.Many things which we take for granted have had to be laboriously fought out or thought out in past times.The other mistake is the opposite one of asking too much of history.We start with man full grown.It may be assumed that the earliest barbarian whose practices are to be considered, had a good many of the same feelings and passions as ourselves.
The first subject to be discussed is the general theory of liability civil and criminal.The Common Law has changed a good deal since the beginning of our series of reports, and the search after a theory which may now be said to prevail is very much a study of tendencies.I believe that it will be instructive to go back to the early forms of liability, and to start from them.
It is commonly known that the early forms of legal procedure were grounded in vengeance.Modern writers have thought that the Roman law started from the blood feud, and all the authorities agree that the German law begun in that way.The feud led to the composition, at first optional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off.The gradual encroachment of the composition may be traced in the Anglo-Saxon laws, and the feud was pretty well broken up, though not extinguished, by the time of William the Conqueror.The killings and house-burnings of an earlier day became the appeals of mayhem and arson.The appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became, or rather were in substance, the action of trespass which is still familiar to lawyers. But as the compensation recovered in the appeal was the alternative of vengeance, we might expect to find its scope limited to the scope of vengeance.Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done.It can hardly go very far beyond the case of a harm intentionally inflicted: even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.
Whether for this cause or another, the early English appeals for personal violence seem to have been confined to intentional wrongs.Glanvill mentions melees, blows, and wounds,--all forms of intentional violence.In the fuller description of such appeals given by Bracton it is made quite clear that they were based on intentional assaults.The appeal de pace et plagis laid an intentional assault, described the nature of the arms used, and the length and depth of the wound.The appellor also had to show that he immediately raised the hue and cry.So when Bracton speaks of the lesser offences, which were not sued by way of appeal, he instances only intentional wrongs, such as blows with the fist, flogging, wounding, insults, and so forth.
The cause of action in the cases of trespass reported in the earlier Year Books and in the Abbreviatio Plaeitorum is always an intentional wrong.It was only at a later day, and after argument, that trespass was extended so as to embrace harms which were foreseen, but which were not the intended consequence of the defendant's act. Thence again it extended to unforeseen injuries. It will be seen that this order of development is not quite consistent with an opinion which has been held, that it was a characteristic of early law not to penetrate beyond the external visible fact, the damnum corpore corpori datum.It has been thought that an inquiry into the internal condition of the defendant, his culpability or innocence, implies a refinement of juridical conception equally foreign to Rome before the Lex Aquilia, and to England when trespass took its shape.I do not know any very satisfactory evidence that a man was generally held liable either in Rome or England for the accidental consequences even of his own act.But whatever may have been the early law, the foregoing account shows the starting-point of the system with which we have to deal.Our system of private liability for the consequences of a man's own acts, that is, for his trespasses, started from the notion of actual intent and actual personal culpability.
The original principles of liability for harm inflicted by
