But to what end,in many cases,this was designed,I am unable to discover;for I see no greater reason for a connexion between man and several animals who are attired in so engaging a manner,than between him and some others who entirely want this attraction,or possess it in a far weaker degree.
But it is probable,that Providence did not make even this distinction,but with a view to some great end;though we cannot perceive distinctly what it is,as his wisdom is not our wisdom,nor our ways his ways.
XI
Society And Solitude The second branch of the social passions is that which administers to society in general.With regard to this,I observe,that society,merely as society,without any particular heightenings,gives us no positive pleasure in the enjoyment;but absolute and entire solitude,that is,the total and perpetual exclusion from all society,is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived.Therefore in the balance between the pleasure of general society and the pain of absolute solitude,pain is the predominant idea.But the pleasure of any particular social enjoyment outweighs very considerably the uneasiness caused by the want of that particular enjoyment;so that the strongest sensations relative to the habitudes of particular society are sensations of pleasure.Good company,lively conversation,and the endearments of friendship,fill the mind with great pleasure;a temporary solitude,on the other hand,is itself agreeable.This may perhaps prove that we are creatures designed for contemplation as well as action;since solitude as well as society has its pleasures;as from the former observation we may discern,that an entire life of solitude contradicts the purposes of our being,since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror.
XII
Sympathy,Imitation,And Ambition Under this denomination of society,the passions are of a complicated kind,and branch out into a variety of forms,agreeably to that variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of society.The three principal links in this chain are sympathy,imitation,and ambition.
XIII
Sympathy It is by the first of these passions that we enter into the concerns of others;that we are moved as they are moved,and are never suffered to be indifferent spectators of almost anything which men can do or suffer.For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution,by which we are put into the place of another man,and affected in many respects as he is affected;so that this passion may either partake of the nature of those which regard self-preservation,and turning upon pain may be a source of the sublime or it may turn upon ideas of pleasure;and then whatever has been said of the social affections,whether they regard society in general,or only some particular modes of it,may be applicable here.It is by this principle chiefly that poetry,painting,and other affecting arts,transfuse their passions from one breast to another,and are often capable of grafting a delight on wretchedness,misery,and death itself.It is a common observation,that objects which in the reality would shock,are in tragical,and such like representations,the source of a very high species of pleasure.This,taken as a fact,has been the cause of much reasoning.The satisfaction has been commonly attributed,first,to the comfort we receive in considering that so melancholy a story is no more than a fiction;and,next,to the contemplation of our own freedom from the evils which we see represented.I am afraid it is a practice much too common in inquiries of this nature,to attribute the cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical structure of our bodies,or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds,to certain conclusions of the reasoning faculty on the objects presented to us;for I should imagine,that the influence of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so extensive as it is commonly believed.
XIV.
The Effects Of Sympathy In The Distresses Of Others To examine this point concerning the effect of tragedy in a proper manner,we must previously consider how we are affected by the feelings of our fellow-creatures in circumstances of real distress.I am convinced we have a degree of delight,and that no small one,in the real misfortunes and pains of others;for let the affection be what it will in appearance,if it does not make us shun such objects,if on the contrary it induces us to approach them,if it makes us dwell upon them,in this case I conceive we must have a delight or pleasure of some species or other in contemplating objects of this kind.Do we not read the authentic histories of scenes of this nature with as much pleasure as romances or poems,where the incidents are fictitious?
The prosperity of no empire,nor the grandeur of no king,can so agreeably affect in the reading,as the ruin of the state of Macedon,and the distress of its unhappy prince.Such a catastrophe touches us in history as much as the destruction of Troy does in fable.Our delight,in cases of this kind,is very greatly heightened,if the sufferer be some excellent person who sinks under an unworthy fortune.Scipio and Cato are both virtuous characters;but we are more deeply affected by the violent death of the one,and the ruin of the great cause he adhered to,than with the deserved triumphs and uninterrupted prosperity of the other;for terror is a passion which always produce delight when it does not press too closely;and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure,because it arises from love and social affection.Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose,the passion which animates us to it is attended with delight,or a pleasure of some kind,let the subject-matter be what it will;and as our Creator has designed that we should be united by the bond of sympathy,he has strengthened that bond by a proportionable delight;
