The Advance on Tullahoma.
At the time of the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, Polk's corps of Bragg's army occupied the main position at Shelbyville, strongly intrenched behind heavy works thrown up during the six months of waiting.These added to the natural strength of the position, and extended from Horse Mountain on the east, to Duck River on the west, and were covered by a line of abattis.The town was noted for the strong Union sentiment of its inhabitants, of which fact the rebels took full advantage to the loss and distress of the people.It is situated about twenty-five miles south of Murfreesboro, and some twenty miles North of Tullahoma, on a branch railroad from the main Nashville line, starting west from Wartrace.
Bragg's right was posted at Wartrace, with Hardee's corps occupying the passes at Liberty, Hoover, and Bellbuckle Gaps.These gaps were all held by strong forces of the enemy, supported by the main command.Polk had an advance in Guy's Gap with his entire command in supporting distance.Bragg's extreme right was protected by cavalry with headquarters at McMinnville, while his cavalry on the left, under Forrest, had headquarters at Columbia, threatening Franklin.
At this time the main base of supplies of the enemy was at Chattanooga, to which the entire country south of Duck River had been made tributary.From Duck River, south, the country is rough, with rocky ranges of hills, which divide the "barrens" from the fertile parts of Middle Tennessee.These "barrens" constitute a high rolling plateau of ground between the ranges of hills at Duck River and the Cumberland Mountains.It is here that the soil during a rainy season offers the greatest obstacle to active campaigning.
Situated on the "barrens," at the junction of the McMinnville branch with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, was Tullahoma, a small straggling village, where Bragg had established his main depot and made a large intrenched camp.The defiles of Duck River, a deep, narrow stream with but few fords or bridges, covered its front, with a rough rocky range of hills immediately south of the river.The principal roads as they passed through these hills bore southwardly toward the line of the enemy's communications and Tullahoma.The Manchester pike passed through Hoover's Gap and reached the "barrens" by ascending a long, difficult canon called Matt's Hollow.The Wartrace road passed through Liberty Gap, and from there it ran into the road along the railroad through Bellbuckle Gap.The direct road to Shelbyville goes through Guy's Gap.
Rosecrans was satisfied from the information he had received that Bragg intended to fight in his intrenchments at Shelbyville, in the event of the army advancing in that direction.The "effective total present," as reported by Bragg as the strength of his army on June 20, 1863, at Shelbyville, was 43,089, of all arms.If he were attacked at Shelbyville and beaten, he would then be in good position to retreat to his strong intrenchments at Tullahoma, and on his retreat could so retard Rosecrans's advance through the narrow winding roads leading up to the "barrens," as to fully protect his own line of retreat and inflict severe loss on the advancing force without exposing his own troops.Rosecrans's plan of campaign was to render useless Bragg's intrenchments by turning his right, and then if possible secure his line of retreat by moving on the railroad bridge at Elk River.Bragg by this means would either be forced to accept battle on ground chose by Rosecrans, or be compelled to beat a retreat on a disadvantageous line, neither as direct nor by as good roads as he would have from Shelbyville and Tullahoma due south.To carry out this plan it was necessary to impress Bragg with the idea that our advance would be in force on Shelbyville, and, if possible, to keep up this impression until the main body of our army reached Manchester.The success of this would keep Bragg's attention on the movement on his front at Shelbyville, and enable our army to pass through the dangerous defile of Hoover's Gap, a narrow passage-way three miles long, between two hills, and so on through Matt's Hollow, an equally dangerous defile, being a gorge two miles long with hardly room anywhere for wagons to pass each other.These passes were only eight miles from Hardee's headquarters and sixteen from Shelbyville.
The plan then of Rosecrans in the advance on Tullahoma, was to make a feint with Granger's corps and the main portion of the cavalry, on Polk's command in his strong position at Shelbyville, and to mass the three main corps on Bragg's right at Wartrace.The army being all ready for the opening campaign, on the 23d of June General R.B.Mitchell with his command--the First Cavalry Division--commenced the advance from Triune on the Eaglesville and Shelbyville pike, in the feint on Polk's command, made a furious attack on Bragg's cavalry and drove in his infantry guards on their main force, pressing the whole line on that front.Granger with the three divisions of his corps and Brannan's division of Thomas's corps, on that day moved with three days' rations from Triune to Salem.
On the same day, Palmer's division and a brigade of cavalry marched to the vicinity of Bradyville, for the purpose of seizing with his advance the head of the defile leading over an obscure road by Lumley's Station to Manchester, and so up to the "barrens." All the other troops were supplied with twelve days' rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, with six days' pork and bacon, and six days' meat on hoof, and were held in readiness to move southward.
These movements being made, the next day the entire army pressed forward on the advance.
In the evening of the 23d, the corps commanders met at army headquarters.The plan of the campaign was fully explained to them, and each one received in writing his orders as to his part in the movement.
